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Abstract This paper presents an analysis of resource acquisition and profile development
of institutional units within universities. We conceptualize resource acquisition as a two-
level nested process, where units compete for external resources based on their credibility,
but at the same time are granted faculty positions from the larger units (department) to
which they belong. Our model implies that the growth of university units is constrained by
the decisions of their parent department on the allocation of professorial positions, which
represent the critical resource for most units’ activities. In our field of study this allocation
is largely based on educational activities, and therefore, units with high scientific credi-
bility are not necessarily able to grow, despite an increasing reliance on external funds. Our
paper therefore sheds light on the implications that the dual funding system of European
universities has for the development of units, while taking into account the interaction
between institutional funding and third-party funding.
Keywords Resource acquisition  Credibility cycles  University governance  Critical
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Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Latour and Woolgar (Latour and Woolgar 1979), the
importance of resource acquisition for the development of research units has been widely
recognized (Braun 1998; Weisenburger and Mangematin 1995). The relevance of this topic
was heightened by funding reforms characterized by increasing competition and selec-
tivity, as well as by state attempts to steer research through resource allocation, a process
that has been labeled as ‘‘academic capitalism’’ (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Geuna 2001).
In this new regime, research units are embedded in a market system and compete for
resources from customers who buy research services based on their needs (Slaughter and
Rhoades 2004).
However, it is largely disregarded that most units are embedded within larger organi-
zations—universities and Public Research Organizations (PROs)—which control a sig-
nificant share of funding. The implications remain poorly understood concerning the
development of units’ activities on the interaction between institutional embeddedness, and
the increasing reliance on external funds.
More specifically, our paper focuses on institutional units within universities below the
department level, such as institutes, laboratories or chairs. For these units, the university
and department control certain critical resources, including the basic infrastructure,
facilities and professorial positions. This is largely an outcome of the dual funding system
of European universities, i.e. university funding is provided through two channels: Insti-
tutional funding attributed to the university as a whole (mostly as a block grant, and then
redistributed internally), and third-party funds acquired by the units directly (Lepori 2011).
Despite an increase of third-party funds in previous decades, institutional funding still
accounts for the largest portion of university budgets in most European countries, with the
exception of the UK (Lepori et al. 2007; Jongbloed and Lepori 2015). This institutional and
funding context marks a strong departure from the US, where most of the research funding
is based on grants.
The goal of this paper is to develop a model of funding acquisition by university units,
which takes into account the interaction between institutional funding and third-party
funding.
To this aim, we conceptualize resource acquisition as a two-level nested process, where
units compete for external resources based on their scientific credibility (Latour and
Woolgar 1979; Joly and Mangematin 1996), while at the same time competing for internal
resources within the university, mostly in the form of professorial positions. This second
process has a longer time frame and might follow different rules, for example it may be
influenced by the university’s strategic priorities and by the extent of educational activities
in the field.
Our model borrows ideas developed in previous work on research units (Crow and
Bozeman 1998), which we specify and adapt to the context of universities. This concerns:
(a) the notion that units might display different profiles of activities (Lare´do and Mustar
2000; Braam and Van den Besselaar 2010), particularly the balance between education and
research; (b) the idea that resource acquisition is based on credibility cycles (Latour and
Woolgar 1979), but these differ depending on the unit’s profile and on the audience
providing resources (Joly and Mangematin 1996); and (c) the notion that resources are not
always substitutable, but some resources are critical and constrain the unit’s development
(Coronini and Mangematin 1999).
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We provide empirical evidence from a sample of 20 university units in the field of
communication sciences within different Swiss universities. In this field, education plays a
central role, but there is an important component of basic research funded by public
agencies, as well as of contract research funded by public and private organizations, such
as the Federal Office of Communication and (media) companies (Lepori and Probst 2009).
Therefore, we observe a diversity of profiles and resource acquisition strategies between
units, as well as within the same department. We hold quantitative data on resources,
activities, and outputs for a 5-year period, which is integrated with qualitative information
on university and unit strategies (Probst et al. 2011). This allows us to analyze differences
between units in the activity profiles and resourcing.
The relevance of this work is threefold. First, we propose and empirically test a realistic
model of the development of university units, which takes into account their embeddedness
and resource dependency. Second, through this model, we are also able to conceptualize
the impact of strategic choices at the university and departmental level on the development
of units and their interaction with external resources. Third, and more generally, we
advance the understanding of the impact of institutional configurations of funding systems
on the development of research at the unit level.
Theoretical framework
Resource dependencies and credibility cycles
Our framework is grounded in three concepts developed by the literature on public
research laboratories, i.e. the activity profiles framework (Lare´do and Mustar 2000), the
credibility cycles in the acquisition of resources (Latour and Woolgar 1979) and the notion
of critical resources (Coronini and Mangematin 1999).
(a) The concept of activity profiles was developed to characterize productive patterns of
research units in terms of their involvement in different types of activities (Lare´do and
Mustar 2000). It builds on empirical evidence of the diversity of units (Joly and
Mangematin 1996) and moves beyond the dichotomy between public (science-oriented)
units and private (innovation-oriented) units (Crow and Bozeman 1987), to provide a
systematic framework to characterize diversity in the mix of activities.
To operationalize profiles, this approach identifies the main contexts of usage of research
and the related types of activities and outputs. Dimensions can then be measured through
quantitative indicators in order to compare units and to follow the evolution of profiles
over time (Braam and Van den Besselaar 2014).
In a previous work, this approach was adopted to examine institutional units in Swiss
communication sciences; profiles have been operationalized in terms of dimensions—
distinguishing between science production, training, education, public and private
transfer—and measured through a set of indicators. We were therefore able to display a
large diversity of profiles, distinguishing between research and education-oriented units
(Probst et al. 2011; Buhmann et al. 2015). Beyond these results, the specific focus of this
paper will be on the change of profiles over time and on their association with resourcing.
(b) Critical resources Activity profiles also reflect the combination of resources used to
perform activities (Carayol and Matt 2004). Units are typically multi-functional and
combine different production factors, such as personnel or infrastructure, in order to
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produce a set of outputs, including scientific publications, training of researchers,
teaching, reports and other applied outputs (Schmoch and Schubert 2009).
Some resources are critical in the sense that they constrain the engagement of other
resources and cannot be readily expanded or replaced (Coronini and Mangematin
1999). For example, a technical facility might be essential to readily expanded or
replaced (Coronini and Mangematin 1999). For example, a technical facility might
be essential to conduct an experiment: in this situation, if the facility cannot be
expanded, additional financial resources or personnel would not be useful. Resource
dependency theory suggests that units try to secure the critical resources for their
survival, thereby reducing the level of uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). If a
resource becomes scarce, units will seek alternatives. For example, when faced with
budgetary cuts within universities, they will try to increase the amount of third-party
funds.
The non-substitutability of resources implies that there are limits to this process, as
universities might control some resources that are critical and constrain the acqui-
sition and productive use of external funds. For example, in natural sciences, units
might have access to a large number of research grants, but need a large investment
on a technical facility, which can only be provided by their institution. Alternatively,
funding agencies might condition grants for junior researchers to the availability of
permanent positions for principal investigators funded by the university. These
examples demonstrate how funding sources are interconnected and how, in a dif-
ferentiated funding environment, some actors control specific types of resources,
which are required in order to access other resources.
(c) The notion of credibility cycles (Latour and Woolgar 1979) expresses the idea that
the acquisition of resources is not based directly on the quality of outputs, but rather
on credibility. This means that the link between output quality and the acquisition of
resources is then indirect: Units accumulate credibility when they perform well,
which can then be reinvested into the acquisition of resources—a mechanism that
leads to cumulative effects showing how scientific reward and resources are dis-
tributed (Merton 1968). Credibility works as capital, which stabilizes the interaction
between funders and performers who are faced with uncertainty regarding the actual
level of quality (White 2002).
While different types of credibility can be distinguished and associated with dif-
ferent audiences (Lare´do and Mustar 2000; Joly and Mangematin 1996)—for
example the scientific community, the public sector, private companies, students and
their families—we focus in this paper on the role of scientific credibility. Scientific
credibility refers to the recognition by peers and can be measured through scientific
output and citations; it is expected to play an important role for science-oriented
external research funds, like those from research councils.
Therefore, the units’ activity profiles also indirectly express how units have posi-
tioned themselves in terms of resource acquisition by accumulating different types
of credibility and constructing stable linkages with the audiences that provide
specific resources. While this process is dynamic, empirical studies display that
profiles are characterized by stability and that changes tend to occur during specific
events, such as the replacement of the director or a major organizational restruc-
turing (Braam and Van den Besselaar 2010).
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Profiles and resource acquisition in university institutes
We specify a model of resourcing for university units that draws on three dimensions, i.e.
the activities performed, the resources required to perform those activities, and the
available funding channels and actors controlling them (Fig. 1).
Most university units engage in three main types of activities, i.e. education (at different
levels: bachelor and master, as well as postgraduate), scientific production and the training
of researchers (publications, PhD theses), and transfer activities to the public and private
sector (Probst et al. 2011). Particularly in the social sciences, with the large number of
students, education represents a core mission. The centrality of education is also empha-
sized by its importance in the funding system of universities in many European countries,
including Switzerland, where large shares of institutional resources (also for research) are
based on the number of students (CHEPS 2010).
Within the available resources, units are—in principle—free to develop research and to
acquire external funds for that purpose. On the contrary, decisions concerning educational
activities are more complex, as in most cases, the set-up and design of curricula is orga-
nized at the department level, while units provide the courses corresponding to their
specialization area.
To perform activities and produce outputs, units mostly rely on different types of human
resources, while other resources – such as technical facilities or data—play a more limited
role in the social sciences and humanities. We suggest a division of human resources into
two groups to distinguish between enrollment procedures and contractual conditions
(Probst et al. 2011).
The hiring of professors is based on structured procedures that require a formal decision
to open a position in a specific area; since most of these positions are tenured, they
represent a long-term investment. Essentially, this process takes place at the department
and university level. New positions are opened either in cases of leave or retirement of
Fig. 1 A multi-level model of resource acquisition and activities
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current professors, or when the department or faculty decides to strategically reinforce a
unit and/or a subject domain. From the perspective of units, professorial positions represent
the most critical resource: they hold most of the scientific credibility and are required to
engage in most of the activities—teaching is mostly provided by professors or at least
requires their supervision, while most grant applications require the endorsement of a
professor.
Other staff includes PhD students and post-doctoral researchers, as well as lecturers and
some support staff who are mostly hired with temporary contracts. The ability to hire non-
professorial staff on a permanent basis is more and more limited in European universities.
When resources are available, temporary staff can be hired directly by units with a simpler
procedure, which does not require the direct involvement of the department.
The funding of units can be divided into two streams: institutional funding provided by
the university from the general budget and third-party funds acquired directly by the unit.
The former mainly originates from the general state allocation to universities, as well as to
a more limited extent from student fees. Third- party funds are provided by public research
funding agencies, such as the national research council, by public and private organizations
and by companies and students for postgraduate education. At the unit level, there might be
large variations in the relative importance of the two streams. At the university level
however, institutional resources account for about two-thirds of total funding in most
European universities (Jongbloed and Lepori 2015).
Institutional funding and third-party funds differ in their allocation criteria, in the
resources allocated to units and in the actors controlling the funding decision. A large share
of institutional funds is used for professorial positions, which are usually long-term.
Institutional funding also includes funding for junior staff, for example teaching assistants
and PhD positions attached to chairs, core technical facilities (such as computing facilities)
and the coverage of general running costs. On the contrary, most third-party funds are for
hiring research personnel (mostly at the junior level) and research costs. Unlike in the US,
in the European context institutional funding also covers part of the general costs generated
by external projects, as overhead rates are usually not sufficient to cover all project costs
(Jongbloed and Lepori 2015). Since they are largely bound by long-term commitments,
institutional funds have a continuous nature (despite attempts to move beyond purely
incremental budgets; Moll and Hoque 2011), while third-party funds are in principle more
short-term and subject to fluctuations.
Institutional funding is usually allocated through some kind of political process at the
university and department level. The decisions in this process might be influenced by
quantitative indicators—such as the number of students and the acquisition of third-party
funds, and the university’s strategic priorities (Lepori et al. 2013) as well as by the
bargaining power of units (Pfeffer and Salancik 1974). Third-party funds are allocated
largely through competitive evaluation procedures, where the credibility of the applicant
plays a central role (Viner et al. 2006).
Model and predictions
Based on these dimensions, we conceptualize the development of university units as the
outcome of a two-level process (Fig. 1).
On the one hand, units are engaged in credibility cycles concerning their research and
educational activities. Unit results are manifested in scientific publications, contractual
deliverables, and degrees. These cycles are associated with specific audiences: the aca-
demic community in the field, external audiences, as well as students and their families.
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The educational cycle is only partially controlled by the units themselves, since teaching
volume is largely dependent on departmental decisions. Acquired resources can be directly
employed for hiring additional staff to perform research and education.
In this process, units can leverage their credibility in order to acquire external funds, and
if they are successful, they accumulate further credibility. However, at some levels, the
expansion of research funded through external sources will be constrained by the amount
of professorial positions. Alternatively, units may invest in teaching activities in order to
receive additional resources from their department, but their freedom to do so will be
constrained by departmental decisions.
On the other hand, a distinct cycle is responsible for the allocation of professorial
positions. This cycle takes place in the medium term (5–10 years) and is based on deci-
sions at the departmental level, which might take into account different criteria depending
on the local conditions. In this regard, three allocation scenarios can be distinguished that
have different implications on unit profiles and development.
In the first scenario, the replacement of professorial positions or newly available
positions is attributed selectively to those units that manage to acquire external funds. In
this model, cumulative processes are fully at work and a close association between a unit’s
credibility and its size (in terms of both professorial and non-professorial staff) is to be
expected.
In the second scenario, the allocation of professorial positions follows the demand for
education (as expressed for example by the number of enrolled students). Departments
expand the educational offer in domains with high demand and, accordingly, allocate
professorial positions to units in that domain. In this model, a close association can be
expected between the volume of education and the number of professorial positions in a
unit.
In the third scenario, decisions on the allocation of professorial positions do not take
into account external resourcing, but are based on political bargaining within departments
and are largely incremental, with retiring professors being replaced within the same
domain. In this scenario, no association is expected between professorial positions and
other characteristics of units, such as the volume of education and research, and the level of
credibility. Units might still be able to hire non-professorial staff from external funding,
but this process will eventually reach a ceiling.
In reality, we expect to observe a mix of these scenarios. A resource-dependency
perspective suggests that the prevalence of each model will be influenced by the way the
state allocates institutional funds to the university, as universities will try to secure their
resource basis (Salancik and Pfeffer 1974), and allocation of resources within universities
tends to mimic the national allocation model (Moll and Hoque 2011; Lepori et al. 2013).
Data and methods
We provide illustrative evidence of the model on a sample of 20 units in communication
sciences within seven Swiss higher education institutions. For these units, we hold a rich
set of data on the composition of personnel, teaching activities, acquisition of external
funds, scientific publications, and doctorates. Data have been collected every year from
2009 to 2013, mostly from official university sources pulled from the unit’s websites and
from individuals within the units (Probst et al. 2011). In order to maintain anonymity, the
units will be designated with numbers.
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Quantitative data
Human resources
We measure human resources in terms of full time equivalent positions (FTE) of staff
employed by the unit for the considered year. We consider total staff employed, profes-
sorial and non-professorial staff. The former includes ordinary, associated, and assistant
professors; in the Swiss system, these positions are tenured and permanent (with the partial
exception of assistant professors).
Educational activities
We measure educational activities through the number of teaching hours delivered by staff
belonging to the unit, separately at the bachelor and master level. This is a suitable measure
as it takes into account the contribution of each unit to curricula organized at the
departmental level. We complement this information with the number of bachelor and
master theses supervised by members of the unit’s as a measure of the subject importance
in the curricula and the effort for supervision. Data on the number of students are available
only at the faculty or department level, while the breakdown at the unit level would be
problematic. In order to tally teaching hours for individual units, data was collected by
coding the university course books.
Research output
We measure the research output of the units by counting the number of publications,
including academic journal publications, books and book chapters. The inclusion of books
is critical given their importance in the social sciences and humanities (Hicks 2004), and
the important internal differences in publication cultures between subdomains of the field
of Communication Science (Lauf 2005). This justifies our choice of using simple (un-
weighted) counts of publications.
Funding acquisition
We hold data on the acquisition of external funds, divided between funds from public
research agencies (mostly the academic-oriented research council) and contract funds from
public and private bodies. The latter have a more applied and policy-oriented character. In
order to limit fluctuations, external funds have been distributed over the whole duration of
projects.
We do not hold figures on the total budget of units, but we compute a gross estimation
by counting a cost of 200,000 Swiss francs (CHF) per year per FTE of professorial staff
and of 100,000 CHF per year per FTE of non-professorial staff, based on the average
salaries in Swiss universities. We add 50 % to this amount as additional costs for travel and
infrastructure, a reasonable estimate for social sciences. We then compute the share of
third-party funds based on the total budget.
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Scientific credibility
We use the number of citations in Google Scholar for professors and senior staff in each
unit as a measure of scientific credibility. Most of this information can be retrieved from
the individual’s Google Scholar profiles. When missing, data have been computed by hand
based on publication lists. Despite some methodological limitations, Google Scholar is
preferred since it provides a broader coverage of non-journal sources, and therefore is
better at covering the subfields of communication oriented towards humanities (Bornmann
et al. 2016). As a cumulative credibility measure, we use the total number of citations of
the members of a unit in the current year during the previous 5 years.
Data are complete for 17 out of 20 units. The three units with missing data will
accordingly be dropped in some of the analyses performed.
Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy takes into account some of the limitations of the data, particularly
the limited number of observations and the rather short time frame, which does not allow
us to fully investigate the long-term process associated with the allocation of professorial
positions.
In a first step, we perform a descriptive cross-sectional analysis using the averages of
the variables over 5 years, in order to reduce the volatility of the data (particularly for
third-party funds). The goal is to test (cross-sectional) relationships between our variables
of interest, particularly between the orientation towards education or research, the com-
position of human resources, and credibility.
To this aim, we run a factor analysis by using four measures of educational activity
(teaching hours and number of theses separate for the bachelor and master level) and five
measures of research activity (total publications, PhD students and graduates, funds from
funding agencies and contracts). Two large factors can be identified: factor 1 accounts for
47 % of the total variance (eigenvalue: 4.195) and, in the rotated components matrix
(Varimax rotation), loads on PhD students (0.860), PhD graduates (0.648), publications
(0.880), research agency (0.871) and contract funds (0.772), as well as to teaching hours at
the master level (0.628). Factor 2 accounts for 23 % of total variance (eigenvalue 2.058)
and loads on teaching hours at the bachelor (0.680) and master level (0.651), bachelor
theses (0.822) and master theses (0.807), as well as on PhD students (0.438). Factor 1 can
therefore interpreted as a measure of research orientation and factor 2 of educational
orientation, with master students, and to a lesser extent, PhD students loading on both
factors.
In a second step, we provide descriptive evidence of changes in the units’ activities and
resourcing over the 5-year period (2009–2013).
As a third step, we exploit panel data to perform regressions on our variables of
interests. Even if the number of observations and the time period are limited, regressions
provide some quantitative support to the descriptive analysis. Since the model suggests that
professorial staff is dependent on the acquisition of external funds and teaching activities,
we first perform a regression with FTEs of non-professorial staff as the dependent variable,
and project funds and teaching hours as the independent variables. Second, our model
suggests that, at least in the time frame considered, the amount of professorial staff should
be considered as given, since its allocation is more long term. Therefore, we run a
regression to ascertain whether the endowment of professorial staff and unit credibility is
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associated with the level of acquisition of external funds (focusing specifically on the
credibility-based research agency funds) and with the amount of teaching hours. Ultimately
we are interested both in cross-sectional (between units) and longitudinal (within units)
variance; therefore, we run random effects models using clustered standard errors.
Results
The context of Swiss communication sciences
The field of communication sciences in Switzerland has a long tradition—particularly its
subdomain of journalism studies—but witnessed a very rapid growth starting in the late
1980s. This expansion was fueled by an increasing demand for education, students
increased from below 200 in 1995 to more than 2000 in 2015, and the subsequent
expansion of educational offers. Before the year 2000, communication sciences was mostly
a side subject within social sciences curricula. Currently four universities offer a full
bachelor curriculum, with more universities offering specialized masters (see Table 1). A
similar expansion took place for research: for example the number of PhD students
increased from less than 10 in the 1990s, to its current rate of about 150. Research also
broadened in terms of subject topics, with the emergence of new topics driven by high
societal demand, such as public opinion studies, health communication, and electronic
communication (Buhmann et al. 2015).
The organization of the units is highly diverse (Table 1). This is a result of differences
between universities in their structure and rules due to the federal organization of higher
education (Lepori 2007). Our common unit of analysis will be the lower organizational
level (what we refer to as units). In German-speaking universities these units are typically
chairs, organized around a full professor, while in some universities they are labeled as
institutes and might have more than one professor. In the larger universities, these units are
embedded in middle-level structures called departments or institutes, which represent the
whole field of communication within the university. The highest level is composed of large
disciplinary faculties (for example social sciences and economics). There are however
variations: in one university there is no department level and communication is a stand-
alone faculty, while another university, given its specialized nature, is composed of largely
independent institutes.
Throughout the paper, we will consistently refer to units as our main level of analysis
and to faculty/departments for the higher levels.
Our sample is composed of 20 units, 16 cover the entire period (2009–2013), whereas
two were created in 2013 and two have been merged into a new unit during this period.
These units belong to seven universities, with the number of units by university ranging
from seven to one (Table 1).
Units cover specific subjects within the field of communication and enjoy a high level of
autonomy in their activities, particularly concerning research. The situation for teaching is
slightly different: as shown in Table 1, the management of the bachelor curriculum takes
place at the higher institutional level (mostly what we would call ‘‘department’’); masters
are more focused, and therefore there is more flexibility for units. But in all cases, the
decision to offer a master is made at the department/faculty level, based also on the number
of students. Within the resources available, faculties/departments are free to offer curricula,
as there is no national-level accreditation and no selection of students.
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The funding system of Swiss universities can be characterized by a weak level of
competitiveness: the share of third-party funds is around 25 % of the total budget and
institutional funds have a large component of historical and/or negotiated resources; the
formula component (based on students and third-party funding) is limited. The internal
allocation process is therefore largely political while indicators, such as the number of
students or the acquisition of external funds, are mostly used for negotiation purposes. The
main process is the allocation of chairs, as it determines the allocation of the largest part of
the budget (in the social sciences, about 70 % of the total costs in 2014 were composed by
personnel costs). Planning of the chairs, particularly the replacement of retiring professors
is a key competence of the faculties and is a central element of university strategic
planning in Swiss universities (Fumasoli and Lepori 2011).
Comparing units: a cross-sectional view
Table 2 provides descriptive information on the sample, using the average by unit for the
years 2009–2013. These data display the level of heterogeneity concerning the size and
activities of the units. In terms of personnel, the smallest unit was created in 2013 through
the hiring of a new professor, while the largest employed five professors and slightly less
than 20 FTEs of staff.
A first characterization can be based on the number of professors: eight units represent a
pure chair model, i.e. with a single professor, three units display an institute model (3–4
professors), and the remaining fall into an intermediate category. These differences display
different institutional characteristics between the German-speaking universities, where the
chair model prevails, and the Italian-speaking university. Units employ an average of three
FTEs of non-professorial staff for each FTE of professorial staff, therefore displaying the
rather steep hierarchical structure of personnel.
In terms of volume, bachelor teaching is more prevalent than master teaching—in 2013
there were 1600 students studying at the bachelor level and 700 at the master level in the
field of communication in Switzerland. Funds from research agencies (mostly the national
Table 2 Sample descriptive information. Average 2009–2013 (only the years of existence of the unit are
considered)
Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum
Total staff (FTE) 6.90 5014 0.61 4.09 18.18
Total professorial staff (FTE) 1.78 1.11 0.33 1.57 4.50
Teaching hours bachelor 334.35 448.00 1.60 245.00 2041.00
Teaching hours master 189.28 166.26 – 3.40 94.60
Bachelor theses (N) 10.43 21.83 – 3.40 94.60
Master theses (N) 7.42 7.40 – 6.30 30.00
Research agency funds (CHF) 134,751.58 163,733.83 – 94,788.10 609,014.40
Contract funds (CHF) 78,194.13 91,654.49 – 39,500.00 291,719.40
PhD students 4.79 3.42 – 3.40 11.40
Total publications 10.42 6.16 1.20 10.33 22.40
Credibility 832.13 1049.90 15.20 471.70 4593.20
Share third party funds 0.16 0.13 – 0.14 0.54
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research council) are higher than contract funds. Data also confirm the complementary role
of third-party funding in resourcing; all units are well below 50 % with the exception of a
newly created unit for which the value is not very reliable.
The sample is also characterized by heterogeneity in terms of the volume and orien-
tation of activities; for research funds and teaching hours, the top three units account for
40–50 % of the total volume for the whole sample. Differences in human resource
endowments and publication numbers are somewhat lower, as displayed by the ratio
between median and standard deviation.
As shown by Fig. 2, most of the units in the field can be considered as balanced, i.e.
with a relative research versus educational orientation near the average of the field. Three
units display a clear orientation towards research, while three units are oriented towards
education. Five of the specialized units are in the same university, suggesting an allocation
model that leaves more room for differentiation.
Correlations display preliminary evidence of the association between a unit’s activities
and staff composition (Table 1): FTEs of professorial staff is highly correlated with
educational orientation, but only weakly to research orientation. Non-professorial staff
Fig. 2 Characterization of units by educational versus research orientatio. Averages of the years in which
the unit existed. Three units (3, 20, and 43) are not displayed because of missing data. Bubble size is
proportional to full staff, numbers are unit IDs
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displays an opposite pattern: it is strongly associated with research orientation, but only
weakly to educational orientation. Once normalized by professorial staff, non-professorial
staff remains only strongly correlated with research orientation. Expectedly, the share of
third-party funds is positively correlated with research orientation, but the coefficient is not
significant.
Table 3 also shows that a unit’s credibility is strongly associated with the amount of
professorial staff, but not with research orientation. Once we normalize credibility by
professorial staff, there are no remaining significant correlations with the educational or
research orientation of the units.
These results suggest that there are two distinct mechanisms driving unit’s activities and
resources. On the one hand, educational activities are closely associated with the amount of
professor positions allocated to units, which is also largely associated with the level of
credibility. On the other hand, individual units might expand further through the acqui-
sition of external research funds, which allows the hiring of additional non-professorial
staff. Accordingly, the research-oriented units have a higher proportion of non-professorial
staff.
Table 4 Indicators of change
Change
2009–2013
(average)
Change
2009–2013
(median)
Variance explained by
units fixed effects
Variance explained by
units and time fixed effects
Professorial
staff FTE
1.19 1.08 0.88 0.89
Non
professorial
staff FTE
1.16 1.14 0.95 0.95
Total teaching
hours
0.99 1.23 0.95 0.95
Teaching
hours
bachelor
1.02 1.00 0.99 0.99
Teaching
hours master
0.94 1.25 0.73 0.74
Total project
funds
1.01 0.98 0.86 0.86
Research
agency
funds
1.42 2.15 0.83 0.85
Contract funds 0.55 0.18 0.61 0.66
PhD students 1.23 1.14 0.85 0.86
Total
publications
0.78 0.94 0.68 0.72
Credibility 1.67 1.49 0.93 0.95
Columns 1 and 2 report the ratio between the 2013 scores and 2009 scores, computed for the average of all
units, respectively the median (the latter is less sensible to outliers). Columns 3 and 4 report ANOVA
decomposition of variance: for example, for professorial staff, 88 % of the variance in the panel is due to
time-independent differences between units, a further 1 % to a general time trend (independent from units),
and finally, 11 % is due to different time changes by unit
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Development over time
As a second step, we investigate patterns in the evolution of units between 2009 and 2013.
Table 4 provides two sets of indicators: the change in the average and median charac-
teristics of units and the decomposition of variance.
On average, the units considered saw a slight increase in personnel, both at the pro-
fessorial level and in total FTEs. Teaching activities also had a slight increase for most
units, due to an increase in teaching hours at the master level. Total project funds were
stable, but show a strong shift from contract funds to research agency funds: in 2009,
project funds were divided almost equally between the two categories, whereas in 2013
research agency funds accounted for three-quarters of the total project funding volume.
Most of this change was due to two units (unit 9 and 22), which had the largest volume of
contractual research in 2009 and moved to a more balanced composition of project funds.
The number of publications witnessed a small decrease, which should not be over-
interpreted given the composite nature of this indicator; credibility strongly increased, but
this represents mostly a baseline effect of increasing citations.
The analysis of variance shows the extent to which differences between units remain
stable over the time period. High stability characterizes the endowment of human resources
(most of the variance in professorial staff is due to a single unit), teaching activities at the
bachelor level and, as could be expected due to its cumulative nature, credibility. More
changes took place concerning master’s teaching and project funds.
Fig. 3 Trajectories of units, project funds and teaching hours. For each unit, the two points represent the
sum of the variables for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 (divided by two), respectively 2011 (divided by two),
2012 and 2013, with the arrow from the first to the second period. Isolated points are units which did not
exist in the whole period
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Master’s education displays an implication of the Bologna reform: at the bachelor level,
communication sciences offers a generic bachelor, with stable content over time, while
master’s programs are more specialized in specific subfields (such as journalism, corporate
communication or political communication). On the one hand, this generates room for
units to expand their offerings based on specific competences. On the other hand, spe-
cialized master’s programs are more susceptible to changes in educational demand and
might be closed when there are too few students.
Variance in project funds can also be expected, given their short-term nature and the
limited size of the units in our sample (in some cases amounts refer to a single project, and
therefore, short-term variations are quite strong). Nevertheless, there are lasting differences
between units that remain stable over the considered period.
Figure 3 displays trajectories of units between the first half of the considered period
(2009–2011) and the second half (2011–2013), to remove short-term variations for two
main indicators, i.e. total teaching hours and total project funds.
Expectedly, we observe more changes in project funds than in teaching hours, given the
high stability of teaching at the bachelor level. Units display different patterns, some of
them increasing the amount of project funds, some having a sizeable decrease. A com-
parison with Fig. 2 displays no clear association with educational versus research orien-
tation, as displayed by contrasting tendencies between units 9, 13, and 22.
As shown by Fig. 4, data do not display evidence of an association between the level of
research agency funds or its development over time and the units’ credibility level.
A careful look at the data reveals very divergent paths between units. Unit 9 seems to be
in a credibility accumulation process, where scientific credibility increases, thus fostering
Fig. 4 Trajectories of units, credibility, and research agency funds. For each unit, the two points represent
the sum of variables for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011 (divided by two), respectively 2011 (divided by two),
2012 and 2013, with the arrow from the first to the second period. Isolated points are units that did not exist
during the entire period
17
the acquisition of research funds—the increase in credibility allowed this unit to replace
contract funds with research agency funds. Unit 13 seems to have reached a ceiling related
to the number of professorial positions: even if credibility continues to increase, the
acquisition of external funds remains stable. On the contrary, unit 11 displays the highest
(and still increasing) level of credibility among all units, but the amount of research funds
only slightly exceeds the median of the entire sample.
Of course, these results may partially be due to the small size of the sample and to some
limitations of the credibility measure considered (particularly the dependency of citation
counts by the subfield considered). But, at least they show that there is no straightforward
relationship between the level of scientific credibility and the acquisition of external funds.
Activities, resources and staff
As a last step, we conduct a quantitative analysis of the development over time of human
resources, as well as relationships with activities and credibility.
As expected, professorial positions display a limited dynamic: total FTEs increased
from 26.81 to 33.88. Among the 20 units considered, 13 had no change in their professorial
staff, but some replacements of retiring staff. Two units lost one position, four units
received one additional position, while one unit (unit 11) received four additional pro-
fessors. This unit is strongly oriented towards education and covers the bulk of education in
the concerned department; its reinforcement could therefore be considered as strategic at
the departmental level.
Interestingly, there is not more variability concerning non-professorial staff. Among the
largest units (with more than 5 FTEs of non-professorial staff), only unit 11 had a strong
increase in staff numbers, which can be associated with the increasing number of pro-
fessors, while change in the other units was limited. There is slightly more variance in the
smaller units, particularly in those who were in the build-up phase at the beginning of the
period considered.
As shown by Table 5, differences in the endowment of non-professorial staff between
units are strongly associated with the amount of project funds and teaching hours by units;
the same variables also explain about one-third of the change in FTEs of non-professorial
Table 5 Panel regressions for non-professorial staff
FTE non professor
Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p
Cons 3.849 0.690 0.000 2.778 0.790 0.000 1.502 0.546 0.006
Project funds (91000000) 0.614 0.131 0.000 0.593 0.096 0.000
Teaching hours 9100 0.516 0.045 0.000 0.505 0.048 0.004
Rsquare (within) 0.177 0.336 0.180
Rsquare (between) 0.635 0.655 0.880
Observations 84.000 74.000 74.000
Groups 20.000 18.000 18.000
Linear regression panel model, random effects with robust standard errors. Within Rsquare shows the
percentage of variance explained by units over time, whereas between Rsquare shows the percentage of
variance explained across units (cross-sectional)
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staff over time. This supports the hypothesis that the hiring of non-professorial staff is a
short-term equilibrium process associated with a unit’s activities (and related resources
from third parties and from the university for education).
The results for the regressions on research agency funds and teaching hours are less
clear (Table 6). For the former, FTEs of professorial staff is significant, but explains a very
low share of the variance, while credibility is not significant. This suggests that the
acquisition of funds is related to other factors, such as the subject domain of the units or
individual strategies of the heads of units. For teaching hours, the amount of professorial
staff explains a large share of variance between units, but the coefficient is not statistically
significant (in the robust specification of the model), hence the effect needs to be con-
firmed. The coefficient of credibility is negative, but not significant.
Discussion and conclusions
The goal of this study was to investigate the relationships between resource acquisition and
patterns of activities, while also taking into account two characteristics of university units:
their multifunctional character, i.e. their engagement in both research and teaching, and the
dual funding system composed of institutional allocation (controlled by the university) and
third-party funds (acquired based on the units’ credibility).
The data we have gathered provides empirical evidence on some key elements of the
model. Units are indeed involved in two distinct resource cycles, one internal, mostly
associated with education, and one external, mostly associated with research activities.
Junior staff can be hired from both sources, and therefore, units can acquire additional
resources, both by expanding their educational activities or by expanding externally funded
research (based on their scientific credibility).
However, the critical resource for unit activities—i.e. professorial positions—can only
be acquired through the internal resource cycle which, according to our data, is more
oriented to education than to research. Allocating professorial positions based on education
is a rational choice for departments in the field. Arguably, this is because of two reasons:
first, the resources controlled by departments are mostly based on education; second, since
professorial positions are long-term, their allocation to research-oriented units would imply
that these units become independent from departments. This behavior is therefore con-
sistent with the common attempts of departments to avoid that their institutes become too
autonomous (a frequently claimed consequence of the increase of external funds; Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978; Bleiklie et al. 2015).
The implication is that university institutes do not necessarily reinvest their scientific
credibility in the acquisition of external funds. When they have the option to expand their
educational offerings (for example thanks to a growing number of students in their
domain), this might be preferable, as it is more likely to lead to the acquisition of additional
professorial positions. There might be some reasons for institutes to expand their volume of
research activities, e.g., the aim to become more independent or grow despite having small
numbers of students.
Our argument is however that such strategic decisions will lead to strong variations in
the relationships between credibility and the acquisition of external resources, a pattern
consistent with our data.
Admittedly our study displays a few limitations, which should be taken into account
when interpreting the results. First, the sample is rather small and heterogeneous, limiting
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the statistical power of the analysis. Second, most processes we deal with are endogenous,
and therefore we cannot make strong claims on causality—but this might be less of a
concern since they are mostly focusing on behavioral patterns. Finally, more in-depth
evidence on the trajectory and behavior of units from qualitative data would support our
findings and provide a more in-depth understanding of the underlying processes.
Despite these limitations, we believe our study provides important insights on the
impact of the configuration of public funding on strategic decisions and activity profiles of
university units. Indeed, it is well known that institutional configurations have a deep
impact on a unit’s activities (Crow and Bozeman 1998), but this phenomenon has been less
studied in the case of university units (see Verbree et al. 2015). To our knowledge, the
connection with the configuration of funding streams, and particularly with dual university
funding, has rarely been made.
The relevance is both theoretical and practical. At the theoretical level, we advanced the
conceptualization of the profiling of units by taking into account their double dependency
on the institution they belong to and external resources. While previous work has taken
into account the heterogeneity of external funds and their allocation modes (Joly and
Mangematin 1996), it is even more important to address the implications of this duality
between institutional and third-party funds, as it characterizes the largest part of the public
research system in European countries (Lepori et al. 2007). In this context, the assumption
that resources are substitutable—and therefore units can switch from institutional to
external funds—is not warranted, particularly when units are embedded within organiza-
tions that control critical resources, such as infrastructure or long-term positions.
In this respect, we point to two directions for further investigation: first, through a more
in-depth examination using qualitative information from the strategic decision-making of
units and how it is associated with the structure of the resource space; second, an extension
of the analysis by systematically comparing different institutional settings and funding
systems. A further important extension would be to move beyond the purely incentive-
based framework adopted in this paper to a more refined understanding of behavioral
mechanisms accounting for differences in the unit’s responses to external pressures, for
example investigating the presence of intrinsic motivations to perform research or the role
of normative pressures and of the imitation of the most successful units.
At the practical level, our analysis highlights the risk that wrong expectations might be
derived from incorrect assumptions and modeling. First, in the specific setting we are
considering, it is not a given that hiring highly reputed researchers as professors will lead
to an increase in the research volume and acquisition of external funds, since, once
appointed, they are embedded in a setting and incentive system, which might alter their
behavior. In this respect, the fact that European universities are mostly funded through a
state allocation comprised of a large historical component (Jongbloed and Lepori 2015)
leads to a very different resourcing and power dynamic than in US universities.
Second, research policies tend to focus on changing the volume of funding by streams,
implicitly assuming that resources are fully substitutable. Our analysis indicates however
that this may not be warranted: simply increasing the amount of third-party funding when
their acquisition and use is constrained by professorial positions, whose number does not
grow and whose allocation remains largely incremental, may lead to non-optimal results.
In other words, the negative effects of increasing external funds on university research
remarked by the literature (Laudel 2006) might be due more to the lack of consideration of
interdependencies and of the different characteristics of resources needed by units than to
shifts in funding composition alone.
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From a policy perspective, it is therefore relevant to ask under which conditions the
interaction between institutional and external funding might work differently, and when the
incentives to acquire external funds may be more effective. Different settings can be
envisaged, however with divergent implications. A system similar to the US, where project
funds cover the full costs and where private donations also fund professorial positions,
could allow high credibility units to expand their volume of research further; such units
would become more autonomous and powerful in respect to their departments, as already
known from earlier studies of resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik 1974), but entail
the risk that research is increasingly driven by external interests to the university. An
alternative, which broadly corresponds to the UK system, would be to create incentives for
departments to develop their research through a highly competitive allocation of institu-
tional funding, therefore aligning the incentive systems of departments and units. This is
likely to lead to a concentration of research-oriented institutes in the selected institutions
and departments, since they would enjoy different growth conditions depending on where
they are situated.
These remarks emphasize how changes in public funding policies should be embedded
in a broader institutional design of the whole regulation system of research.
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